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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to establish that free agency, which is a
capacity of many animals including human beings, is compatible
with indeterminism: An indeterministic world allows for the ex-
istence of free agency. The question of the compatibility of free
agency and indeterminism is less discussed than its mirror image,
the question of the compatibility of free agency and determinism.
It is, however, of great importance for our self-conception as free
agents in our (arguably) indeterministic world.
We begin by explicating the notions of indeterminism and free
agency and by clarifying the interrelation of free agency and the
human-specific notion of free will. We then situate our claim of
the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism precisely in
the landscape of the current debate on freedom and determinism,
exposing an unhappy asymmetry in that debate. Then we pro-
ceed to make our case by describing the mathematically precise,
physically motivated model of projective simulation, which em-
ploys indeterminism as a central resource for agency modeling.
Projective simulation was recently developed as an AI framework
for flexible learning agents (Briegel and De las Cuevas, Scientific
Reports 2:400, 2012). We argue that an indeterministic process
of deliberation modeled by the dynamics of projective simula-
tion can exemplify free agency under indeterminism, thereby es-
tablishing our compatibility claim: Free agency can develop and
thrive in an indeterministic world.
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1 Introduction
Can there be free agency, a capacity exemplified by humans as well as by
many non-human animals, if the world is indeterministic? This question is
arguably more important than its mirror image, the question whether free
agency is compatible with determinism. But unlike that latter question,
the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism is not often addressed
explicitly. In this paper we argue that free agency and indeterminism are
compatible. We make our case by providing an explicit model in which an
indeterministic, stochastic process—a random walk—is constitutive of the
behavior and development of a free agent over the course of time.
Providing an explicit model is important for three reasons. First, in
giving such a model, we show that, and how possibly, there can be free
agency in an indeterministic world. Since there are good reasons to assume
that our world is indeterministic, this should be good news for all defenders
of human freedom. Second, in our model, indeterminism turns out to be a
valuable resource that free agency can be based on, rather than a disturbing
influence as often assumed. This provides a fresh perspective on the role of
indeterminism in action. Third, in stressing the importance of a positive “how
possibly” argument for the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism,
we hope to help to clarify the dialectics of the debate about freedom and
determinism.
The structure of our paper is as follows. We start, in §2, by clarifying
the basic concepts of indeterminism and free agency. We then describe the
dialectics of the free agency/determinism debate and thereby situate our
paper in the context of a broader discussion. In §3, we describe a stochastic
process model for free agency under indeterminism, based on the AI learning
scheme of projective simulation. We explain how the short- and long-term
dynamics of the model provide the basis for flexible, adaptive, and sensible
agency, discussing a concrete example in §4. We conclude in §5.
2 The dialectics of free agency and (in)determinism
2.1 Basic concepts
In this paper we address the interrelation of two important concepts, one
action-theoretical—free agency—and one metaphysical—determinism. Be-
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fore we enter a discussion of their dialectical interrelation, we clarify our use
of these two concepts.
We need to stress up front that there is a considerable difference in the
basis on which our characterizations of these two crucial notions rest. Deter-
minism is a philosopher’s term of art that has a fairly well-defined meaning.
While the term has somewhat varying uses in the current freedom debate, its
meaning is historically quite stable, due to determinism’s role in an unbro-
ken tradition of arguments over centuries. Therefore, in §2.1.1 we can simply
clarify our specific use of the term with respect to a few nuances that have
played a role in extant debates. Free agency, on the other hand, is a notion
whose importance for various philosophical discussions has only become ap-
parent with the advent of action theory as a philosophical sub-discipline in
the second half of the 20th century, and terminology is not established firmly.
Most of the current freedom debate, including its terminology, focuses on free
will rather than on free agency. Our focus is, however, on free agency, which
is one of the preconditions of free will, and therefore more basic. A discus-
sion of free will arguably leads beyond the realm of action theory proper, and
free will may well be an exclusively human capacity. Free agency, in contrast,
should apply to human beings, many animals, and possibly also (future) arti-
facts.4 Our aim is to delineate a rich and philosophically useful concept that
avoids two obvious pitfalls: triviality on the one hand, and philosophically
loaded presuppositions that threaten to limit free agency to human beings,
on the other hand. Accordingly, our clarificatory discussion of free agency
in §2.1.2 is not just a matter of taking a stance on nuances of extant use,
but rather a philosophical act of explication. Since that explication may be
controversial, we proceed slowly, step by step. But first, determinism.
2.1.1 Determinism and indeterminism
To begin with the metaphysical side, by determinism we mean the metaphys-
ical claim about our world that as of now, there is only one real possibility
for the future to turn out. Indeterminism, on the other hand, is defined sim-
ply as the negation of determinism: as of now, there is more than one really
possible way for the future to turn out. These definitions refer to the notion
4There is a growing literature that promotes “action theory first” when it comes to
metaphysical aspects of freedom. For a particularly good example, see Steward (2012).
She also provides compelling cases of non-human animal agency including, but not limited
to, other mammals.
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of real possibilities for the future, without specifying that notion any fur-
ther.5 In the literature, the future possibilities in question are often further
specified to be possibilities that are allowed for by the laws of nature given
the present state of the world. Thus, it is common to define (“Laplacean”)
determinism as the claim that given the current (maximal intrinsic) state of
the world and the laws of nature, only one future development is compatible
with these laws.6 In our view, this additional specification of the future possi-
bilities in question amounts to an unnecessary and possibly harmful addition
to the basic definition of determinism, which can and should be avoided in
the debate about free agency. The notion of a current state of the world is
philosophically highly contentious,7 and similar problems surround the no-
tion of a law of nature.8 In order to discuss the interrelation of freedom and
determinism, no position needs to be taken with respect to the metaphysi-
cal status of laws of nature and intrinsic states. What is important is that
according to universal determinism, at any time there is just one real possi-
bility for the future. It is this idea of predetermination, of the uniqueness of
the possible development of the world, which arguably spells trouble for the
notion of freedom, independently of any account of laws and intrinsic states.
2.1.2 Free agency
Turning to action theory, we will use the expression “free agency” and related
terms in the following way: Free agency is a capacity of certain beings, free
5For a discussion of the notion of real possibility vis-à-vis other notions of possibility,
see Müller (2012) and Rumberg (2016).
6See, e.g., Butterfield (2005) and Earman (2006). See Müller (2015) and Müller and
Placek (2018) for discussion.
7If a state is not specified via intrinsic properties, a verdict of determinism can be
spurious. For example, if you describe today as “a day before a week of rain”, which is
an extrinsic characterization, then no alternative possiblity is left open for next week’s
weather. We need states to be intrinsic. In the current debate about intrinsic properties,
however, no real consensus has been reached; see, e.g., Langton and Lewis (1998) and
Eddon (2011). Considerations of the relativity of simultaneity may raise further worries
in connection with the requirement of having to specify a global Now to make sense of a
“current state of the world”.
8Some respectable authors, such as Van Fraassen (1989) and Giere (1999), even defend
the claim that in the relevant sense, there are no laws of nature. Note that given the
definition of determinism in terms of laws and states, the absence of laws implies that the
world is indeterministic, because any future development is compatible with the empty
set of laws.
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agents. These agents act freely at least some of the time. We contrast a free
action with non-agentive, mere behavior. A case of behavior (typically, a
bodily movement) thus is classified as mere behavior, or as free action,9 and
free agents are those beings that can act freely.10 For example, human beings
are free agents, and they typically act freely. Most of what we do—taking
a sip of coffee, walking to the store, typing a sentence—exemplifies our free
agency. We even exhibit our free agency when we intentionally refrain from
moving, as in a game of hide-and-seek, or when we act sub-intentionally, as
in wiggling our toes during a boring meeting. Certainly there are boundary
cases. But sometimes we also clearly exhibit mere, non-agentive behavior—
when a doctor triggers our patellar reflex by hitting us under the knee, for
example, or when we blink when an object comes close to our eyes. We are
free agents, but we do not exhibit our free agency all the time.
Free agency vs. free will. Traditionally, agency and freedom are most
often discussed under the heading of “free will”. There is a long discussion
about the notion of free will itself as well as about its metaphysical precon-
ditions. We will use some of the terminology that has been developed in
that discussion, but in this paper we do not discuss free will. In philosophy,
free will is mostly tied to specifically human traits, such as being the proper
subject of moral praise and blame, or a capacity for conscious deliberation
or for the linguistic expression of self-reflective thought.11 To be sure, these
9We avoid taking a stance on the thorny issue of whether some instances of mere
behavior constitute actions, albeit unfree ones. There are good reasons to hold that
agency, properly understood, has to be free agency, implying real alternatives. On the
other hand, we do call some of our actions unfree, e.g., when we act under coercion. In
fact, under the heading of “freedom of action” one can find a vast literature on free vs.
unfree actions (for an overview, see, e.g., O’Connor, 2016). For our present purposes, we
do not need to discuss cases of purported unfree actions. We stick to clear examples of free
actions vs. mere behavior that do not involve coercion, political oppression, compulsive
behavior or such like.
10We stress the importance of both the persisting entity, the agent, and the event in
which the agent is involved, the action. It is true to say both that the agent causes certain
happenings, and that these happenings are events. In this way, we avoid the dichotomy
of “agent causal” vs. “event causal” approaches as unhelpful, following Kane (2014) in his
“AC/EC” approach.
11See again O’Connor (2016) for a good overview of relevant philosophical issues. In
the scientific literature, “free will” is sometimes used less specifically than in philosophy—
sometimes in the sense of our notion of free agency, but also for something even less
demanding than that. For example, a “free will” condition in quantum correlation experi-
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are central aspects of our human lives, and we do not want to diminish their
importance in any way. By stressing the usefulness of a less demanding no-
tion of free agency, we just want to oppose the idea that there is no sensible
notion of freedom that avoids the specifically human commitments of the
notion of free will. Our explication of the notion of free agency is meant
to supply such a broader, more basic notion, which can also apply to other
animals, and possibly also to (future) artifacts.12 A clash between a notion of
freedom and the doctrine of determinism (or of indeterminism) arises already
for the thinner, less exclusive notion of free agency, not just for free will.13
And however free will is spelled out in the end, free agency certainly forms
a precondition for it. Thus we hold that a discussion of the interrelation
of determinism and free agency has systematic priority over a discussion of
the interrelation of determinism and free will, which occupies so much of the
philosophical literature.
Explicating free agency, via examples of attribution. Free agency is
not limited to human beings, as we said: many animals are free agents. For
example, cats and crows, when playing or looking for food, act freely.14 This
does not mean that we have to attribute free will to them, or to deny them
ments such as Hensen et al. (2015) has got nothing to do with morality, and in fact just
demands the breaking of correlations with the past. In the biological literature such as
Brembs (2011), “free will” is used in a way that comes very close to what we here call “free
agency”. Since this is a paper in philosophy, we stick to the usage of “free will” established
in that subject, which is also the historical origin of the notion.
12A note on philosophical terminology to avoid a misunderstanding: There is a large
discussion about so-called “freedom of action”, meaning the absence of external obstacles
(see note 9). What we are calling “free agency” is not the same phenomenon as what is
discussed as “freedom of action”. The latter notion is employed to illustrate or even replace
the notion of “free will” when it comes to assessing human behavior. We are aiming at
a much broader notion. Also, “freedom of action” is traditionally associated with mak-
ing room for freedom under the assumption of determinism (so-called compatibilism, see
§2.3.1), while we are looking for an indeterminism-friendly notion of freedom, as explained
in §2.2.2.
13On this point, see again Steward (2012). This important book has done a lot to show
that the metaphysics of free agency is the proper place to discuss the issue of freedom vs.
determinism.
14We again refer to Steward (2012, esp. Ch. 4) for an abundance of examples. Method-
ologically, it is important to note that we are here after the explication of a notion of free
agency for which there is no acknowledged off-the-shelf definition. This requires us to work
out the boundaries of this notion starting from clear positive and negative cases, such as
cats and crows vs. tables and chairs.
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freedom altogether when we find, quite sensibly, that they fall short of pos-
sessing free will. But neither would it be enough to attribute their behavior
to them in a merely causal way. If a crow catches a worm, causal attribution
is warranted, but what goes on is relevantly unlike a stone breaking a win-
dow. What we are trying to explicate is a notion of free agency that allows
for the attribution of an action to an agent in a way that lies between mere
causal attribution and the demands of attributing an action out of free will.
The former type of attribution does not distinguish a free action from a case
of mere behavior: behavior of both kinds is causally attributable. The lat-
ter type of attribution, on the other hand, traditionally implicates conscious
self-reflection and the possibility of moral assessment, limiting that type of
attribution, for all that we know, to human beings.
In order to home in on the middle-level notion of free agency that we
are after, we start from the fact that we have a well-entrenched practice of
attributing agency in such a third, middle-level way, both towards human
beings and towards other animals. In fact, many of our everyday practices
depend on that type of attribution. Consider, first, an example of human
interaction: somebody stepping on your toes on a bus. In such a case we
make a three-fold distinction between (1) mere behavior, implying just causal
attribution (e.g., a person stumbling because they were pushed and could
not help it), (2) acting out of free will, implying moral attribution (e.g.,
a person acting with the morally blameworthy intention of hurting you, or
with the morally praiseworthy intention of alerting you to a pick-pocket), and
(3) acting freely, but not out of free will, which implies non-moral agency-
attribution (e.g., a person acting absent-mindedly: behavior which was under
their control and which they could have avoided, but which wasn’t intended
either). Our reaction to what happens on the bus (e.g., whether we demand
and/or accept an apology) depends strongly on these distinctions.15
15In human interaction, moral categories may be brought to bear in all three cases when
taking a longer-term perspective, which is often adequate. This makes it difficult to give
unassailable examples of “mere free agency” attribution in humans. We expect others not
just to refrain from hurting us intentionally, but also to take precautions against acciden-
tal damages, no matter whether these damages might come about through mere agency
(absent-mindedly, non-intentionally) or even through mere causation (e.g., through re-
flexes). In almost all cases, our natural inter-personal attitude is what Strawson (1962)
has called the “reactive attitude” of moral attribution. Thus, somebody may feel moral in-
dignation toward a person who coughs during a concert, thereby diminishing their pleasure
in the music. Here the coughing is a reflex and as such not subject to moral evaluation,
but the person who coughs may have a cold and know that they are prone to coughing.
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Second, consider examples of feline agency. It may well be that for non-
human animals, acting out of free will is out of the question: we do not praise
or blame a cat in a moral sense. But we do make a distinction between the
cat’s mere behavior and her free agency. In the former case, we view that
cat, as it were, mechanically; in the latter case, we attribute actions to her
as an agent that wants certain things and not others, and which can be
influenced through teaching. We see this distinction clearly in cases in which
the cat’s behavior bothers us so that we want to stop it.16 Take a case of
mere behavior, e.g., the cat shedding hair on your dark carpet. In order to
stop that behavior, you may decide to brush the cat, or perhaps to get her
on a diet leading to less shedding: the aim is to alter the cat physically in a
direct way. In a case of the cat’s free agency, our attitude is different. Thus,
when the cat sits down on your keyboard while you are trying to type, you
may recognize that this is a bad attention-grabbing idea of hers, and try to
teach her not to do it. Reacting in this way, you address the cat as an agent,
as an individual who experiences the world and who can adapt her behavior
over time when given feedback of certain kinds.
Explicating free agency: criteria. Based on our remarks and examples
so far, we can now attempt to explicate the notion of free agency in a more
detailed way. We want to make its distinctive traits explicit with a view
to assessing the model that we will present in §3. As we said, defining free
agency in a precise way is much harder than defining determinism. We will
not argue for a fixed set of necessary-and-sufficient criteria here. We will,
however, provide some necessary criteria and suggest a sufficient criterion.
We have already established that we attribute free agency in many cases,
including cases in which we do not attribute free will, and that we dismiss
the attribution of free agency in cases of mere behavior, which we attribute
causally but not as agency. In building on these examples, we are assuming
that the attribution of free agency tracks an important and real difference
among what is going on in our world. The notion of a free agent (a system
(We do not take a stance on whether the moral assessment here is warranted. A lot usually
depends on details.) Clearer examples of mere free agency attribution in humans occur,
for example, in cases of physical training, as when you take a swimming lesson and the
trainer provides feedback on the way you move.
16This does not mean that the distincion has no place when the behavior pleases us, or
when our attitude toward it is neutral. In fact, our attitude in the cases we describe might
be different; this does not influence the type of attribution.
8
Müller & Briegel, Free agency under indeterminism, May 15, 2018
that can act freely) thus has clear instances, such as human beings, cats and
crows, and clear non-instances, such as stones, tables, and thermostats, who
exhibit mere behavior at best.17 Now, which difference in the world is it that
the notion of free agency is tracking? What are the distinctive traits of free
agency?
The main point flowing from our discussion so far is that an agent acting
freely is special because it does something. It thereby influences the course
of nature in a way that goes beyond mere causal influence: the action can be
attributed to the agent as an agent since it was up to the agent, or the agent
was the source of the action, or the action was under the agent’s control.18
This thought has to be unpacked in order to yield a list of criteria. We
start with a precondition of all kinds of behavior: (1) causal influence. This
criterion is, however, not yet specific; causal difference-making is not suffi-
cient for free agency. Thermostats make a causal difference to what happens,
but they cannot act freely. Further criteria have to be added. Guided by the
above discussion, we propose the following minimal list of additional criteria:
free agency has to be (2) non-rigid, (3) flexible and adaptive, and (4) sensi-
ble. We proceed to argue for our criteria in turn, in the order of increasing
strength.
(1) Causal difference-making is an uncontroversial precondition for agency.
To act is to make a difference to what is happening.19 Such difference making
may be deterministic (as in a thermostat) or indeterministic (as in Feynman’s
(1965, 147) example of an indeterministic bomb). Neither deterministic nor
indeterministic causation is yet sufficient for agency.
17It is possible to acknowledge the fact that we attribute free agency while denying that
there is such a thing as free agency at all. Such a sceptical option (an error theory of agency
attribution) is always available, but we can dismiss it as irrelevant for our approach, which
aims at establishing the possibility of free agency by presenting an explicit model.
18A sizable part of the free will discussion at present targets notions of control, such as
regulative vs. guidance control (see, e.g. Fischer and Ravizza, 1998). Since the examples
used in discussions of control are often subject to moral assessment, and since there is no
clear consensus on a taxonomy of different types of control or on which notion of control is
needed for free agency or for free will, we do not frame our discussion in terms of control.
19When discussing free will, it is important to count omissions and refrainings as morally
attributable actions, at least in some cases. For example, we would morally blame a person
for doing literally nothing when he could easily have saved a drowning child. We will not
take a stance on the thorny issue of omissions in our discussion of free agency. It seems
fairly obvious that we sometimes do attribute omissions as free actions, e.g., when a cat
remains completely silent and immobile while preying on a mouse. But for our discussion
in what follows, nothing hinges on this.
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(2) Free agents have the capacity to behave non-rigidly. Rigid responses
are typical of so-called reflex agents. A thermostat is an example of this class:
the response is always a function of the input (in the thermostat’s case, the
room temperature). A thing that has a unique, rigid way of reacting in any
given situation is not a free agent. It is true that free agents, such as cats,
do have a repertoire of rigid reflex behaviors, as we do ourselves. But free
agents cannot be limited to reflexes in their behavior.20
(3) Requiring flexibility and adaptivity is a way of spelling out in which
way a free agent should be non-rigid. A thing that responds completely
erratically, such as a lottery machine, is non-rigid, but we would not call
such a thing a free agent. For free agents, non-rigidity plays a positive role
on two different time-scales. On a short time-scale, free agents can act in a
flexible way: in following through a course of action, such as moving from
one place to another, a free agent has a repertoire of possible variants which
are employed, e.g., to overcome obstacles. Finding a route blocked, a reflex
agent may be stymied, while a free agent can vary its behavior and thereby
find new ways to proceed. On a longer time-scale, free agents adapt to their
environment and the feedback they receive from it: they learn, and they can
be trained (they may even be able to train themselves, through practicing and
playing). Free agents develop over time, and the way they have developed
influences the way they act at a given time. This means that for a free agent,
the notions of identity over time and memory play a crucial role. Free agents
have to be learning agents, whose history and experiences influence the state
of their memory, and as a result, their behavior. For example, a hungry cat
will do various things in order to find food (flexibility), and over time will
learn where the mice live (adaptivity).
(4) Our last criterion, sensibility, is a way of specifying in which way this
flexibility and learning have to play out. The term “sensible” is admittedly
20There is a certain paradoxical aspect to rigidity vs. freedom: at least in the moral case,
we often assume that an ideal free agent should have a firm character and always do the one
right thing. But such an agent would behave rigidly. Would that take away her freedom?
With respect to our list of criteria, it is important to stress that a free agent has to have
the capacity to act non-rigidly. This leaves room for rigid behavior in certain morally
relevant situations. We take it to be an advantage of our approach that we can explain
how adaptation through learning can lead to rigid behavior in selected circumstances, thus
accounting for rigidity through freedom. See note 54 for some additional discussion. Note
that acquired rigidity is not the same as a built-in reflex. A reflex agent may have no
capacity for acting non-rigidly; a free agent who has acquired rigid behavioral traits has
done so on the basis of learning from non-rigid actions.
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somewhat vague. The idea is that the flexibility and adaptivity of a free
agent’s actions have to be something for the agent, they have to make sense
for it. In living beings, this idea can be explained in terms of the agent’s
flourishing, of satisfying its needs, and of its striving for what is good for it. It
is a challenge, which we do not claim to have resolved fully, to spell out this
idea of sensibility in a way that is general enough to apply uncontroversially
both to natural and to artificial agents. It is certainly difficult to provide
a foothold for the agent-relative normative dimension involved here when it
comes to artefacts. Agents can be sensible in different ways, so that the
criterion of sensibility is inherently disjunctive. Rather than trying to spell
out this full disjunction (which would provide a necessary criterion), here
we spell out one type of sensibility as a sufficient criterion (without taking a
stance on whether that criterion is also necessary): An agent fulfilling criteria
(1)–(3) exhibits free agency if it acts on its own reasons or considerations,
and develops the structure of its considerations (its memory) in a meaningful
way over time. Note that again, two time-scales are involved in this account:
One is the short time-scale of the flexible dynamics selecting from among the
possible individual actions at a given time; the other is the long time-scale
of adaptation through learning from many individual actions.21
Notions explicitly avoided. In closing, we mention a few notions that
we have explicitly tried to avoid in our explication of free agency. Our list
of criteria does not mention intentions, nor the will, nor rationality, nor
rightness or wrongness. We fully agree that these notions are important for
a discussion of free will, and also for assessing human agency more generally.
For our purposes, however, it is better to avoid them in order not to trigger
misleading associations with the notion of free will.
It is clear that we need to avoid talking about rightness and wrongness—
moral categories are not applicable when we limit ourselves to free agency.
For intention, rationality, and the will, we do not take a stance on whether
these notions can be fully accounted for on the basis of free agency alone.
Rationality is sometimes tied to high-level linguistic capacities, which would
21In the free will debate, the short time-scale aspect of sensibility is stressed throughout,
e.g., as a criterion of “reasons-responsiveness”, which is often assumed to be compatible
with determinism (see, e.g. Dennett, 1984). The longer time-scale of learning is much
less discussed (but see Kane’s view referred to in notes 50 and 54). In our view, the
failure to acknowledge the long-term perspective of learning is a significant shortcoming
in discussions of free will, but even more so in discussions of its precondition, free agency.
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limit rationality to human beings;22 other uses of the term are less stringent.
We do not wish to become tangled up in the associated terminological debate,
and thus we avoid speaking of rationality. With respect to the will, the
situation is similarly complex. There is an important tradition that holds
the will to provide the direct target for moral assessment;23 and in this sense,
the will has no place in our discussion. A less loaded notion of the will may,
however, very well be appropriate in the discussion of free agency. A similar
comment applies to the notion of intention: in view of a strong tradition
that views intentions as subject to moral assessment,24 we refrain from using
the notion, but we do not claim that intention talk makes no sense for non-
human free agents. Note also that while we have approached the subject of
free agency via agency attribution, we do not subscribe to the idea that we
are here just dealing with a stance we can adopt more or less appropriately,
like the so-called intentional stance.25 Free agency is a real phenomenon, and
we are interested in its compatibility with the metaphysical claim that the
world is indeterministic.
2.2 On the relation of free agency and determinism
Having set the stage at the conceptual level, we now come to the question of
how free agency and determinism are related (§2.2.1). This will allow us to
state precisely what the purpose of our paper is (§2.2.2).
2.2.1 Compatibility and incompatibility claims
There are four different claims of compatibility and incompatibility of free
agency and (in)determinism that can be made:
(DetCom) Free agency is compatible with determinism.
(DetInc) Free agency is incompatible with determinism.
(IndCom) Free agency is compatible with indeterminism.
(IndInc) Free agency is incompatible with indeterminism.
22See, e.g., Davidson (1974).
23See, e.g., Kant’s Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals (Kant, 1785).
24See note 23.
25See, e.g., Dennett (1987).
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These claims are largely independent. Logical consistency dictates only that
one not hold both (DetCom) and (DetInc), or both (IndCom) and (IndInc),
since these pairs are contradictories. All other combinations of claims are
logically consistent. Thus, somebody could argue for both (DetInc) and (In-
dInc), thereby proving that no matter whether the world is deterministic
or indeterministic, there can be no free agency.26 At the other end of the
spectrum, one could argue for both (DetCom) and (IndCom), thus showing
that there can be free agency no matter whether the world is deterministic
or not.27 (Note that this position would still leave it open whether there ac-
tually is free agency, since the claims are only about conceptual possibilities,
without paying attention to details of what our world is like and which things
it contains.)
The four claims differ in the manner in which they can be established.
Claims (DetCom) and (IndCom) are compatibility claims. Such claims can
be proved directly by example, that is, by providing an actual or a possible
scenario in which both notions are instantiated. Thus, in order to establish
claim (DetCom) in this direct fashion, one should describe a way the world
could be like such that both determinism holds, and there is free agency.
Claim (DetCom) could also be established in a somewhat weaker way, indi-
rectly: If one knows that there can be free agency—e.g., because one knows
that there is free agency in our world—, then one has shown that at least
one of the compatibility claims (DetCom) or (IndCom) has to be true. If one
now also has established an incompatibility claim, e.g., (IndInc), then one
knows (since (IndInc) rules out (IndCom)) that claim (DetCom) has to be
true. This indirect method of proof is weaker since it relies on stronger as-
sumptions, viz., that one already knows about the possibility of free agency
and that one has established an incompatibility claim. Another indirect
route to establish claims (DetCom) or (IndCom) would be to piggy-back one
compatibility claim on the other. Thus, if one has established claim (Det-
Com), one might venture to establish claim (IndCom) by arguing that certain
26For an argument along those lines, see, e.g., Pereboom (2001). A similar conclusion
is suggested by Van Inwagen (2000). With specific reference to moral responsibility, the
“impossibilist” case has been made by Strawson (1994).
27This is the aim of so-called agnostic compatibilists, or semi-compatibilists, such as Fis-
cher and Ravizza (1998). We comment on their specific version of compatibilism briefly
in §3.1 below, arguing that it is based on too limited a view of the possible role of inde-
terminism for free agency. For critical assessment, see also Wagner (2013).
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forms of indeterminism do not threaten the argument for (DetCom),28 and if
one has established claim (IndCom), one might try to establish claim (Det-
Com) by replacing the relevant instances of indeterminism by some form of
determinism-based unpredictability.29
Claims (DetInc) and (IndInc) are incompatibility claims. In order to es-
tablish such a claim, one has to show that it is impossible that both notions
could be true of our world. For example, claim (DetInc) could be proved
by showing how one can derive a contradiction from the assumption of de-
terminism together with the assumption of free agency. Such claims can be
expected to be harder to establish than compatibility claims: for compati-
bility, it suffices to give a single example; for incompatibility, one has to rule
out a whole range of possible examples.
Note that the dialectical situation we have sketched so far is completely
symmetrical between the notions of determinism vs. indeterminism. For both
metaphysical positions, there is a compatibility claim and an incompatibility
claim, and the methods for establishing such claims are exactly parallel.
The only further remark we can make at this point is that prima facie, it
should be easier to establish claim (IndCom) than claim (DetCom). In order
to establish claim (DetCom), one has to present a scenario in which both
determinism and free agency are exemplified, and since determinism is an
extraordinarily strong constraint on ways the world could be like, there are
few candidate scenarios. Indeterminism, on the other hand, is defined purely
negatively and can be true in various different ways. Thus, there is more
room for relevant possible scenarios exhibiting both indeterminism and free
agency, which would establish claim (IndCom).30 Similarly, it should prima
28The so-called semicompatibilism of Fischer and Ravizza (1998) employs an argument
of that form. See also note 30 below.
29While we are not aware of a discussion of this point in the free will literature, we
have often been confronted with this point in discussions, e.g. by reference to the notion
of deterministic chaos or pseudo-randomness. There are strong arguments showing that
certain classes of chaotic deterministic models behave in a way that is empirically indistin-
guishable from the behavior of certain classes of indeterministic models (see, e.g., Werndl,
2011). For the purpose of this paper we can leave it open whether such arguments can
be employed for a piggy-backing strategy in specific cases. Note that many current tech-
nical uses of randomness avoid pseudo-randomness as unsafe and instead employ physical
indeterminism. See also notes 33 and 47 below.
30In fact, the following cheapshot strategy suggests itself: If claim (DetCom) could be
established via some deterministic model that involves agency on some planet A, one might
add some indeterministic happenings in a distant galaxy. The resulting model would then
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facie be easier, for the same reason, to establish claim (DetInc) than claim
(IndInc).31 But these are prima facie considerations, which can of course be
overruled.
2.2.2 The precise aim of our paper
Given the layout of the dialectical landscape just described, we can now say
precisely what the aim of our paper is: We aim to establish claim (IndCom)
of the compatibility of indeterminism and free agency, via a direct route: We
will provide a possible scenario in which both free agency and indeterminism
can be exemplified. (Actually, we provide more than is strictly required for
the compatibility claim: we do not just exhibit one instance, but a generic
possibility via a whole class of models.) In this paper we do not take a
stance on the compatibility question for determinism.32 And we make no
assumptions about the actual truth of determinism or indeterminism either.33
no longer be universally deterministic, but indeterministic. Still, it would continue to
exhibit agency on planet A.
31In fact, with a view to the cheapshot strategy mentioned in note 30, it seems nearly
impossible to establish claim (IndInc) without thereby also establishing claim (DetInc).
That is, those who hold on to the possibility of free agency can hardly hope to establish
the impossiblity of free agency under indeterminism (claim (IndInc)), at least without
distorting the claim of universal determinism. On the other hand, it might be possible
to establish claim (DetInc) without thereby having to deny the possibility of free agency
completely: we stress again that there are many ways for indeterminism to be true.
32To indicate where our sympathies lie: We are quite convinced that the incompatibility
claim (DetInc) can be established. Good arguments in favor of the claim include the
consequence argument given by Van Inwagen (1983), which has sparked a literature of
its own, and Kane’s argument in terms of ultimate responsibility (for a reappraisal and
defence, see Kane, 2014).
33The truth or falsity of determinism as a metaphysical thesis is certainly a contentious
issue in philosophy. A straightforward empirical resolution of the matter seems impossible
on conceptual grounds: Indeterminism means the existence of more than one possibil-
ity for the future to turn out, but looking back, one always finds just a single realized
possibility. Along these lines one can claim that there is no, and in fact cannot be any,
empirical confirmation of indeterminism: unrealized possibilities are just that, unrealized,
and therefore empirically inaccessible. This would mean that the metaphysical question
has to be left open. Any argument in favor of indeterminism (or of determinism, for that
matter) therefore has to make extra assumptions, and any such assumption will turn out
to be controversial. See, e.g., Wüthrich (2011) for a pertinent discussion. There is not
even a firm consensus about the status of specific physical theories with respect to their
determinism or indeterminism. Earman (1986, 2006) has shown that the issues involved
are extremely intricate. With respect to quantum mechanics, which is certainly a good
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2.3 On terminology and the space of options
2.3.1 Terminology
Given that the dialectical situation is tidy and symmetrical, it is unfortunate
that the terminology that has been established, especially in the recent free
will debate, suggests asymmetries between the compatibility claims (Det-
Com) and (IndCom). An asymmetric treatment has become well entrenched
in the debate, but as we will show, the asymmetries are spurious and in fact
distort the debate.
Consider the labels used for major positions in the free will debate.34
candidate for an indeterministic theory, philosophical discussions often point out that there
are rival deterministic and indeterministic interpretations, with Bohmian mechanics often
named as the best contender for a deterministic and realist ontology.
It seems to us, however, that the abstract philosophical discussion, especially in relation
to quantum mechanics, misses an important aspect of current scientific practice. Hack-
ing (1990) has shown how indeterminism started to be acknowledged as an explanatory
resource in the social and later on also in the natural sciences, starting in the late 19th cen-
tury. Meanwhile, indeterminism has become a crucial technological resource for our current
society. A growing industry centers on providing good sources of randomness for various
applications including secure communication, legal contracts, and simulations. There is
universal agreement that the gold standard for certified randomness is so-called device-
independent randomness, which is directly tied to the assumption of the fundamentality
of quantum-mechanical indeterminism. See Acín and Masanes (2016) for an overview,
and see note 47 below for a reference to a prominent current implementation effort. The
reasoning behind these massive efforts is that only indeterminism at the ontological level
can secure true randomness. Before this background, we hold that an interesting critique
of the assumption of indeterminism should take the form of an attack on the proposed
schemes of certifying randomness, rather than a reference to skeptical “underlying deter-
minism” scenarios. Our point is not that we know that such attacks are impossible, but
just that critics of indeterminism seem not to be trying. In a similar vein, Gisin (2018,
§8) challenges the Bohmian program to provide some “brave new ideas” that so far seem
to be lacking. Physically problematic aspects of the Bohmian program are pointed out by
Kiukas and Werner (2010).
34Apart from Steward (2012), there is not much discussion of compatibility and incom-
patibility questions about free agency in the action theoretic literature. Steward employs
the free will terminology, e.g., in labeling her own position as “Agency Incompatibilism”
(Steward, 2012, 13). Since the compatibility issues discussed in the free will debate are
structurally exactly analogous to the issues we are facing here (the possibility of a realistic
reading of a specific type of attribution given a certain metaphysical background), we also
employ the free will terminology in what follows. While this has the disadvantage of per-
haps triggering too many associations to the free will discussion itself, making up a new
terminology would also come at a considerable price and is, in our view, better avoided.
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First, it is striking that the label “compatibilism” is reserved for claim (Det-
Com) of the compatibility of free agency and determinism, but that there
is no similar label for claim (IndCom).35 Similarly, “incompatibilism” is re-
served for claim (DetInc) of the incompatibility of free agency and determin-
ism,36 but there is no established label for the incompatibility claim (Ind-
Inc).37 As a symptom of the fact that the debate fails to reflect the symmetry
of the positions, one can note that many systematic overviews of possible po-
sitions in the free will debate, such as Fischer et al. (2007), are structured
around the compatibility or incompatibility of various claims with determin-
ism only. Given such an approach, the possible positions with respect to free
agency can be given as a 2× 2 matrix as shown in Table 1.
determinism determinism
is true is false
compatibilism (DetCom) soft determinism agnosticism (?)
incompatibilism (DetInc) hard determinism libertarianism (?)
Table 1: Compatibilism vs. determinism.
This table reflects the traditional, century-old concern that determinism—
whether motivated scientifically, theologically or otherwise—might pose a
threat for our freedom. Assuming the truth of determinism, there are, accord-
ingly, specific labels for the compatibilist and incompatibilist positions, viz.,
“soft determinism” for the combination of the compatibility claim (DetCom)
and determinism, and “hard determinism” for the combination of the incom-
patibility claim (DetInc) and determinism, which rules out free agency. In
case determinism is false, however, the opposition between claims (DetCom)
and (DetInc) is not really relevant. In the table, we have given only tentative
35Belnap et al. (2001, 204) note that it would be better if claim (IndCom) were called
“compatibilism”: It is the more important compatibility claim, as it pertains to our ar-
guably indeterministic world. We agree that there should be a separate label for claim
(IndCom), and that “compatibilism” would be an apt label, but we will not attempt to
change the long-established terminology here. (Neither do Belnap et al.)
36As we said, Steward (2012, 13) labels her own position as “Agency Incompatibilism”
in order to stress that her view targets not free will, but free agency as its precondition.
37While there are no established labels for claims (IndCom) or (IndInc) themselves,
there is a commonly used label for a class of arguments that many philosophers hold to
establish claim (IndInc), viz., “the luck objection”. We will briefly discuss one form of that
objection in §4.3.
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labels for compatibilism/incompatibilism under indeterminism, since the ta-
ble does not depict the relevant details with respect to claims (IndCom) vs.
(IndInc). An agnostic position might be based on the deterministic compat-
ibilist claim (DetCom) and take no stance on the indeterministic compat-
ibility question (IndCom) vs. (IndInc), thus leaving it open whether there
can be free agency if determinism is false. The libertarian position, on the
other hand, which is often treated as the main (or even sole) rival position to
compatibilism for friends of freedom, is defined as a combination of incom-
patibilism (DetInc), the indeterministic compatibility claim (IndCom), and
the actual assumption of free agency and indeterminism—where the latter
is often assumed to be established via an indirect argument resting on the
assumption of free agency in our world.38
In our view, libertarianism is not a helpful alternative to compatibilism
because it is too specific, combining three (or even four) logically independent
claims under one label. Of course, such a package deal is dialectically more
fragile than compatibilism, since it can be attacked in many different ways,
especially since it spans both action theory (in view of the compatibility
and incompatibility claims involved) and metaphysics (in view of the fact
that libertarians assume the truth of indeterminism). As we said, we do
not address the metaphysical issue at all in this paper. And with respect
to compatibility and incompatibility claims, our task here is just to defend
one aspect of libertarianism, viz., claim (IndCom) of the compatibility of
free agency and indeterminism. This claim is not a rival to the compatibilist
claim (DetCom) at all.39 And just as defenders of (DetCom) can remain
silent on the incompatibility question (IndInc), so we can remain silent on
the incompatibility question (DetInc) in establishing (IndCom).40
38See Wiggins (1973). Note that Kane (1998, 13) phrases his “intelligibility question”
in the following way: “Can we make sense of a freedom or free will that is incompatible
with determinism?” This question combines two issues that we wish to keep separate: the
incompatibility claim (DetInc) and (reading “make sense of” as “establish the possibility
of”) our claim (IndCom).
39In fact, given how strong a metaphysical assumption determinism is, claim (DetCom)
almost implies claim (IndCom)—but not in an interesting way (see note 30). Our model
is meant to establish claim (IndCom) in an interesting, non-derivative way.
40Thanks to Verena Wagner for discussion in connection with her paper “Reconciling
projects”, presented at Konstanz on 20 March 2015.
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2.3.2 The space of options
With respect to the actual space of options in the discussion of free agency
and determinism, a useful, symmetrical 2× 2 table can picture the possible
positions w.r.t. (DetCom)–(IndInc) as shown in Table 2.
compatible with indeterminism: indeterminism:
free agency yes (IndCom) no (IndInc)
determinism: (A) freedom possible anyway (B) freedom only
yes (DetCom) under det.
determinism: (C) freedom only under indet. (D) no freedom
no (DetInc)
Table 2: Compatibility and incompatibility claims.
This table shows that, as we remarked above, a position that falls under
the traditional label of compatibilism is not yet fully detailed: Compatibil-
ism (DetCom) stands for the upper row of the table, which comprises two
fully specified positions, (A) and (B). Of these, position (B) is the position
advocated in the title of a paper that puts forward what has become known
as the “Mind argument”41 (Hobart, 1934): “Free will as involving determi-
nation and inconceivable without”. Not all compatibilists nowadays want to
hold on to such a position, since they may not wish to make the possibility of
freedom dependent on the thesis of determinism. (Most authors assume that
science, not philosophy should give the final verdict on the truth or falsity of
determinism.) Many compatibilist authors nowadays want to remain neutral
with respect to the truth or falsity of determinism.42 In that case, however,
they will have to argue for claim (IndCom) in order to avoid commitment
to position (B).43 Such agnostic compatibilists are thus also facing the task
to which this paper is devoted. They should therefore welcome the model
we are proposing in this paper. At any rate, the reality of agency as well as
41That name is due to the fact that the paper, and other papers with similar claims,
appeared in the journal, Mind, in the 1930s. See Van Inwagen (1983, 16) and Franklin
(2011) for the terminology.
42For example, writing about free will rather than free agency, Fischer (2012, 4) stresses
that moral responsibility should not be “hanging on a thread” in the sense of depending
on “subtle ruminations of theoretical physicists”.
43The fact that freedom-affirming compatibilists who want to avoid a commitment to
determinism also have to tackle claims (IndCom) and (IndInc) is also noted by Franklin
(2011, 202n5).
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the truth or falsity of determinism should be discussed independently of the
conceptual compatibility claims here at issue.
3 A model for free agency under indeterminism
Our task in this section is to motivate (§3.1) and then explain (§3.2) a model
of free agency under indeterminism, which is based on the recent AI learn-
ing and deliberation framework of projective simulation (Briegel and De las
Cuevas, 2012). In §3.3 we argue that the model can indeed exemplify free
agency under indeterminism. We provide a discussion of a concrete example
in §4.
3.1 Motivating the model
In our constructive task of establishing the compatibility claim (IndCom),
we want to show how indeterministic randomness can be a useful and in fact
constitutive resource for a free agent.44
Here is a first way in which randomness can be useful for an agent. The
model to be described below goes far beyond this, but we offer the following
considerations as a first step towards the idea that as an agent, randomness
can be your friend. Consider tie-breaking: An agent is in a situation in which
a particular choice has to be made, but the actual choice does not matter. Fa-
mously, this is the situation of Buridan’s ass situated symmetrically between
two equally attractive stacks of hay. Since there is nothing in the situation to
tip the balance one way or the other, the creature has to find a way to break
the tie if it wants to avoid starvation. Randomness can come in handy here:
It is perfectly appropriate to tie the tie-breaking to some random event. And
this is so independently of whether the randomness can be traced back to
some microscopic happening in the agent’s brain, or whether it is enforced
by tossing a coin (or, better, sending a photon through a beam splitter). So,
given that agents from time to time are facing choices whose outcome does
44We stress again that our task of establishing claim (IndCom) is logically independent
of taking a stance on claims (DetCom) vs. (DetInc). In the model we will propose, in-
deterministic randomness plays a constitutive role. By proposing this model we do not,
however, claim that there could not be a different model for free agency that could be
realized in a deterministic world. While we doubt that this is possible—see note 32—, we
do not address the issue of the compatibility of free agency and determinism in this paper
at all.
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not matter, having a built-in random tie-breaking mechanism would be help-
ful. At this point, however, the randomness of the tie-breaking seems to play
no crucial role; it is just one option for breaking ties, and there is no strong
incentive for the agent to employ randomness. We will not take a stance on
whether such tie-breaking situations, in which there is really nothing in the
situation to tip the balance, are common for us humans or not; they may in
fact be rare.45
Here is a next kind of situation in which randomness can really help an
agent in a specific and crucial way. Animals trying to escape from a predator
will be caught easily if their escape behavior is predictable. So it has great
survival value for typical prey to show erratic, unpredictable escape behavior.
And such behavior is found in many experimental studies, e.g., in cockroaches
and in flies.46 Here the task is not just tie-breaking (the animal has to run
away in some direction rather than stay where it is), but tie-breaking in an
unpredictable way (the predator should not be able to guess which direction
and which path the animal will choose). While unpredictability may be
realized in different ways, if physical randomness is available, it could be an
obvious and biologically natural means to achieve unpredictability, so that
here we have a strong case for a positive role of randomness in agency.
Still, these tie-breaking examples only show that randomness can be use-
ful for an agent in the sense that successful agents will profit from having
sources of randomness available to handle special types of situations.47 A
model for free agency under indeterminism should provide more if it is to
make a positive contribution in the current debate about free agency: Such a
45Ironically, it seems that among the best candidates for mere tie-breaking situations we
find the experimental settings of neuroscientific free-will experiments such as Soon et al.
(2008). In that experiment, participants have to choose, roughly equally, between the two
options of clicking left or right. Whether you click left or right in such an experiment
really does not matter at all.
46See, e.g., Couzin and Krause (2003), Domenici et al. (2008), Brembs (2011), and
Domenici et al. (2011).
47Tie-breaking may arguably also be invoked when the agent’s choice does matter, but
the agent’s preferences are incomparable rather than tied. And at a much higher level of
sophistication, randomness is required for us human beings as users of modern communi-
cation devices as well: The security of communication channels, including, e.g., internet
connections, depends on the availability of genuine randomness for encryption (Shannon,
1949). Initiatives such as the U.S. NIST beacon project work towards providing certified
and publicly documented genuine randomness for a variety of technological and commer-
cial purposes. See https://beacon.nist.gov for the U.S. service.
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model should not stop at making the general point that randomness can be a
useful resource, but show explicitly how randomness can be a useful element
in the dynamical coming to be of an individual, specific action.
At this point, two approaches are available. The common approach is
to start with a basically deterministic model of agency, such as offered, e.g.,
by various compatibilist analyses of agency, and add a random element at
the right place of the causal history.48 This, in turn, could take the form
of showing how such a random element would be tolerable, i.e., it wouldn’t
destroy the basically deterministic model,49 or it could take the form of show-
ing how such a random element provides a positive contribution to the given,
otherwise deterministic agency model.50
The other approach, which we call deeply stochastic agency modeling, is
not to start with a deterministic model at all, but to work out a stochas-
tic model, in which indeterminism is the central resource for the model’s
dynamics. Stochastic models are well known in the sciences. Important ex-
amples include Einstein’s explanation of Brownian motion (Einstein, 1905)
and Fisher’s model of natural selection in population genetics (Fisher, 1930).
Such models have a broad range of applications both in the natural and
social sciences (Van Kampen, 2007; Gardiner, 2009). In what follows, we
propose such a stochastic model: free agency that is based on a fundamen-
tally random process.51 According to that model, a learning agent comes
to act at the end of an underlying stochastic process in her memory that
is extended in time. Randomness thereby plays a constitutive role: options
and considerations unfold stochastically and culminate in action.
48All the options for indeterministic theories of agency discussed in the overview by
Franklin (2011), e.g., the so-called “deliberative libertarian” theories of Mele (1999) and
of Clarke (2000), are of that type.
49See, e.g., Fischer and Ravizza (1998, 253).
50See, e.g., Kane (1998, Ch. 5) on “self-forming actions” as indeterministic happenings.
See the essays in Palmer (2014) for discussion.
51For the model at hand, there is a specific additional reason, over and above what
we said in note 29, why a deterministic (pseudorandom-based) substitute would not be
of much use: Such a variant would preclude straightforward quantum extensions of the
model, which are currently being studied in physics and in AI (Paparo et al., 2014; Dunjko
et al., 2016).
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3.2 The model: Projective simulation
We now describe a stochastic process model of free agency under indeter-
minism based on an associative memory organization and random option
selection. The model, called projective simulation (PS), is built around a
dynamic network of episodic memory (Briegel and De las Cuevas, 2012).52
Stochastic transitions in such a network, suitably interpreted as an agent’s
considerations, are the basis of an explicit, formally well specified model of
deliberation in a learning context.
The basic memory structure of an agent embodying the projective simu-
lation model is episodic and compositional memory (ECM), which is consti-
tuted by a dynamic network of so-called clips. Clips are the units of episodic
memory and correspond, in the simplest case, to memorized actions or per-
cepts, or short sequences thereof. Such a network is pictured in Figure 1.
The network is dynamic both with respect to its topology (number of clips
and connections between them) as well as with respect to the weights of the
connections between adjacent clips, which change through learning.
action
Clip 0
Clip 4
...
...
Clip 3
Clip 1
Clip 2
Clip 5
percept
p(c1|c0)
p(c2|c0)
p(c3|c1)
p(c4|c3)
Figure 1: Episodic and compositional memory as a stochastic network of
clips (Figure adapted from Briegel and De las Cuevas (2012)).
The basic process of deliberation for a PS agent can be expressed within
the percept-action framework of artificial agents (Russell and Norvig, 2011)
and goes as follows. Given a specific state (topology and weights structure)
of the ECM and triggered by some perceptual input, a first memory clip
is activated. Subsequently a random walk through the clip network ensues,
52Briegel and Müller (2015) use the model in an action-theoretic context, but do not
relate their discussion to the options that are open in the freedom debate.
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involving a number of transitions that is not determined beforehand, until
activation is coupled out, triggering some motor action. The random walk
through the clip network follows the weights (probabilities) as specified in the
given state of the ECM. In Figure 1 the bold arrows indicate such a random
walk from a percept to an action consisting of five steps. The arrows are
labeled by the respective probabilities; for example, p(c1|c0) is the probability
that, given that Clip 0 is activated, the next activated clip is Clip 1. These
probabilities, or weights, are built up through the agent’s learning history and
thus encode her past experience connecting sensory input to action output,
including the consequences (good or bad) that these actions had for the
agent. Weights are updated after an action has been performed and feedback
has been received (as part of the perceptual input), e.g., by strengthening
those connections that were activated during the random walk leading from
percept to rewarded action. The update of the ECM may also include the
stochastic generation of new clips through variation or composition of existing
ones, which changes the topology and size of the associative network. This
provides additional flexibility for the agent to develop different patterns of
deliberation and action over time.
In one run of projective simulation, a given percept as input at time t0 can
lead to any of a number of actions as outputs, and output can be triggered
at different times t0 + m∆t corresponding to a deliberation length of m
transitions (each taking the time ∆t, assuming a simple model with uniform
dynamics). Various refinements and extensions of the model are possible and
have been explored. These include different learning schemes, e.g., with the
capacity to generalize (Melnikov et al., 2017), or with meta-learning, which
involves the adaptation of the learning parameters themselves (Makmal et al.,
2016). Further extensions concern the possibility of quantizing the model,
which allows for a quantitative speed-up in deliberation and active learning
(Paparo et al., 2014; Dunjko et al., 2016). Here we will focus our discussion
on the basic structure in order to make our case as transparently as possible.
It should be noted up front, though, that lack of complexity of the model
is due to our discussion of the simplest base case, and that more complex
schemes are readily available.53
53Recent developments include applications in robotics (Hangl et al., 2016, 2017a,b) and
in the design of novel quantum experiments (Melnikov et al., 2018).
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3.3 Projective simulation: Free agency under indeter-
minism
Here is how the projective simulation model provides the ingredients for free
agency, and thereby witnesses our claim of the compatibility of free agency
and indeterminism.
First, it is clear that the model is indeterministic—it is based on an in-
deterministic random walk for each coupling of sensory input (percept) to
motor output (action). It should also be noted that this indeterministic as-
pect is a fundamental feature of the model in the same way in which other
well-known models in physics, such as the ones referred to at the end of §3.1,
are fundamentally indeterministic. In projective simulation, the indetermin-
ism is not added on top of an otherwise deterministic model, and so the
model cannot be adequately described as a randomization of some other, de-
terministic, deliberation scheme. Therefore the model truly exemplifies the
less explored strategy of deeply stochastic agency modeling described at the
end of §3.1.
Second, we claim that the model provides all the ingredients needed to
exhibit free agency. Together with the previous step this shows that the
model is a witness for our compatibility claim.
In the description we give in the following, we adopt a certain semantics
for the clips in the agent’s ECM network: we will speak about the content of
the clips as considerations. This is meant to provide the basis for associations,
and thus to make sense of the stochastic hopping of activation in the network,
including the coupling in of percepts and the coupling out of actions. At
the same time, the terminology of “considerations” is meant to be low-level
enough not to suggest that the agents somehow interprets the content of her
memory clips consciously, or reflects on them.
We proceed by establishing that the model meets the criteria for free
agency laid out in §2.1.2. Thus, we have to argue that the actions of a PS
agent can be causally relevant, non-rigid in a flexible and adaptive way, and
sensible. Causal relevance is clear since a run of projective simulation is
itself a causal process that terminates in some action. The non-rigidity of
actions is also obvious: Given one and the same perceptual input and the
same internal state, several actions are possible—the agent’s behavior is not
a hard-coded reflex. Over a short time-scale, that non-rigidity is also flexible
and not erratic: the agent goes through a process of activating different con-
siderations before triggering an action. On the time-scale of a single action,
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the deliberation process—the transition from perceptual input to resulting
action—is guided by the current structure of the agent’s memory (see §4 for
an explicit example). On the longer time-scale of the agent’s development,
the agent’s behavior is also non-rigid in the sense of being adaptive. The
agent learns from past experiences by adjusting its structure of consider-
ations, e.g., by reinforcing connections that have led to success (perceived
positive feedback), and by creating new clips and making them available for
long-term adaptation as well. Thereby it fits its behavior to the environment
it finds itself in. In summary, the PS agent fulfills all the necessary condi-
tions for free agency formulated in §2.1.2: causal relevance, non-rigidity, and
flexibility and adaptivity.
In §2.1.2, we spelled out a notion of sensibility as part of a sufficient crite-
rion for free agency. We argued that an agent fulfilling the necessary criteria
that we just discussed is a free agent if it acts on its own considerations, and
develops the structure of its considerations in a meaningful way over time.
The issue is, therefore, whether the PS agent’s actions are really sensible in
this sense.
In favor of our claim that a PS agent’s actions are sensible, we can offer
two main arguments that relate to the mentioned two different time-scales.
First, while the projective simulation process is indeterministic, each single
instance of that process makes sense before the background of the agent’s
learning history reflected in the transition weights and, more generally, in its
memory structure at the given time. On the short time-scale of an individual
action, a single stochastic process leading from sensory input to that action
represents the dynamical succession of considerations in the agent’s associa-
tive memory structure. Each clip in the ECM network that is activated in
the course of that deliberation process represents some consideration that
is relevant for the situation at issue, and the actual succession of these clips
represents the associative progression of considerations leading to the agent’s
action. While this individual process is stochastic, i.e., its concrete course is
not fixed beforehand, the process is clearly specifically the agent’s: both the
topology of the ECM network and the clip-to-clip transition probabilities are
shaped by the agent’s actual past and learning history, marking the practical
deliberation process as belonging to that individual agent.
Second, on the longer time-scale of learning and forming behavioral dis-
positions, each individual deliberation-action process makes sense because it
contributes to the agent’s individual history and to its development as an
agent. Each such process allows for learning through the feedback (in the
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simplest reinforcement learning scheme, a perceived reward or punishment)
that the agent receives from the environment. That feedback first of all
affects the transition weights between clips that were activated during the
actual deliberation process. Furthermore, as part of the projective simulation
scheme, new clips may be created out of already existing ones, which need
not correspond to any factual experience in the agent’s past. If the activation
of such “fictitious” clips, as part of a random walk, leads to rewarded actions,
their embedding into the clip network will be strengthened and they may
become an integral part of the episodic clip network. This process of random
clip creation, together with the mentioned dynamics, can then lead to new
options for action, as well as to new paths of considerations in the agent’s
memory.
Also related to the longer time-scale of learning, we can note that based on
indeterministic decision processes with learning through feedback, a PS agent
can develop (almost) deterministic reactions to specific stimuli. PS agents
thus need not be unreliable or haphazard. In some cases they can exhibit
behavior typical of hard-coded routines (even starting from quite arbitrary
connection weights in their memory): given proper reinforcement, an agent
can, as it were, learn to become a rigorist about certain forms of behavior in
specific circumstances. This allows the model to capture in a sensible way
the dynamics of building up strong habits, or a firm character, as one might
say, in the face of almost unlimited options for action.54 Rigorous behavior is,
however, not always warranted, and the model does not enforce it. In some
cases, such as in tie-breaking, a PS agent may still react completely randomly,
and in other cases in which different considerations favor different actions, it
will show the appropriate flexibility in its actions. So, a PS agent can learn
to behave reliably when this is required, and still retain a certain amount of
flexibility, up to complete randomness, when that is more appropriate. The
PS agent’s adaptive use of indeterminism makes good sense.
Within the PS model, therefore, we use indeterminism as a central and
54In the free will debate, indeterminism-based accounts (i.e., libertarian theories) are
often confronted with a “challenge from luck”, one aspect of which is exactly how to
account for a firm moral character in the face of indeterminism (see also §4.3 below).
Learning through feedback, in our view, provides an adequate answer: over time, an agent
can acquire firm responses to certain types of situations, while still remaining somewhat
flexible in most cases. In a similar vein, although limiting the role of indeterminism to
torn decisions leading to what he calls “self-forming actions”, Kane (1998) stresses the role
of an agent’s history in accounting for moral responsibility.
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basic resource. Importantly, this does not mean that we expose an otherwise
deterministic agent to certain random processes. The PS model is not based
on an underlying deterministic deliberating agent that is somehow “random-
ized” to arrive at the model in a second step. The random processes we
are referring to here are not something external that would randomize the
agent’s actions (as if the agent was given independently and beforehand, and
then perhaps enslaved by outside randomness). On the contrary, the ran-
dom processes form a constitutive element of the agent’s memory and the
very process of decision finding.
It should be pointed out that the model of projective simulation, in-
cluding its rules for transitions and compositions in clip space, represents a
specific model of reinforcement learning in a physically inspired approach to
(quantum) artificial intelligence. It is meant to be a simple model for natural
and artificial agents that can learn and show flexible and sensible behavior.
We do not claim to give an account of any deeper or more advanced aspects
of human agency such as free will. For our purposes, projective simulation
serves as a formal model of free agency, where the process of decision finding
that precedes an action in a given learning environment can be mapped out
in detail.
4 The dynamics of projective simulation: An
example
Our description of the PS model and of its interpretation so far has been fairly
abstract. In order to balance our description, we now give an (oversimplified)
example of the dynamics of projective simulation in which the abstract talk
of considerations is tied to a concrete situation. Here is our little story: We
assume that while you are typing at your sunny desk, your cat is sitting on
the floor and is about to either jump on the desk, perhaps to lie down on your
keyboard, or to walk away. We will use this example both to illustrate the PS
dynamics and to strengthen our argument for the possibility of attributable
free agency under indeterminsm.
4.1 A toy model
In order to keep the discussion managable, we limit ourselves to the toy
model shown in Figure 2, which comprises just one possible input percept s,
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two possible actions a1 and a2, and three intermediate considerations c0, c1,
and c2.
s c0 c1
c2
a1
a2
p(c0|s)
p(a1|c0 )
p(a1|c1 )
p(c1|c0 )
p(c2|c1 )
p(a2|c2 )
p(c0|c2 )
Figure 2: The clip network of our toy model. Arrows are labeled by the
respective transition probabilities.
We interpret these clips in the cat’s memory, with reference to our little
story, as follows: Percept s represents the situation that the cat is in: sit-
ting on the floor, sunlight on the desk, her owner sitting at the desk typing.
Action a1 represents jumping, action a2, walking away. The given percept s
triggers consideration c0 with probability p(c0|s) = 1. The associative consid-
erations linking percept s to one of the actions a1 or a2 in the stochastic ECM
network are interpreted as follows. Consideration c0 represents remembered
episodes of the cozy feeling of the warmth of a sunny patch on the desk. This
consideration can, in the given network, either trigger action a1 (jumping on
the desk), with probability p(a1|c0), or a transition to clip c1, with respective
probability p(c1|c0) = 1− p(a1|c0). Consideration c1 represents remembered
episodes of the cat’s owner giving attention to her when she had disturbed
him while he was typing. Again, this consideration can, in the given network,
either trigger action a1 (jumping on the desk), with probability p(a1|c1), or
a transition to clip c2, with respective probability p(c2|c1) = 1− p(a1|c1). Fi-
nally, consideration c2 represents remembered episodes of the owner brushing
the cat quickly off the desk after she had jumped there. The two possible
outcomes after this consideration in the given network are to trigger action
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a2 (walking away), with probability p(a2|c2), or to transition back to clip
c0 (which we can interpret as reconsidering the situation), with respective
probability p(c0|c2) = 1− p(a2|c2).
4.2 Calculating the dynamics
Based on this network structure and given specific values for all the men-
tioned transition probabilities, we can describe the fine structure of the cat’s
possible courses of deliberation and action quantitatively. In order to sim-
plify the math, let us assume that all transitions from a given node have
equal weight, such that, for example, both possible transitions from clip c1—
jumping (a1) or arriving at the next consideration c2—have equal probability
of p(a1|c1) = p(c2|c1) = 12 . An agent who has learned from experience will of
course have adjusted the transition weights. For example, if the cat has often
been rewarded for jumping on the desk, her weight p(a1|c1) for the c1 → a1
transition (jumping on the desk) will be much larger than the weight for the
transition c1 → c2 (recalling being brushed off the desk).
The shortest path through the network leading from percept s to some
action is the following:
s→ c0 → a1.
The probability of that path, given s, is 1 · 1
2
= 1
2
. In Table 3, we list a few
more paths with their respective probabilities. (Note that due to the cyclic
structure of the model network—the possible transition from c2 to c0 enables
arbitrarily long cycles—there is no limit to the length of possible paths, but
of course the probability of paths becomes smaller the longer they are.)
length probability jump or
Path l pr(l) walk away?
s→ c0 → a1 2 0.5 jump
s→ c0 → c1 → a1 3 0.25 jump
s→ c0 → c1 → c2 → a2 4 0.125 walk away
s→ c0 → c1 → c2 → c0 → a1 5 0.0625 jump
s→ c0 → c1 → c2 → c0 → c1 → a1 6 0.03125 jump
s→ c0 → c1 → c2 → c0 → c1 → c2 → a2 7 0.015625 walk away
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 3: Possible paths in the network of Figure 2.
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Given our simple stochastic dynamics, the total probability that the cat’s
deliberation will finally lead to jumping at some time after the time of the
percept s, t0, under the assumed weights, is the sum of the probabilities of all
paths leading to jumping, which comes down to pjump = 6/7. The probability
for walking away is, accordingly, pwalk away = 1 − pjump = 1/7. Note that by
adjusting the weights, we can arrange for any ratio of jumping vs. walking
away.55
In the given model, jumping can occur immediately, after two steps (each
of duration ∆t), at time t0 + 2∆t, but also after a much longer deliberation
time, e.g., after 12 steps, corresponding to time t0 +12∆t. Similarly, walking
away can occur after four, after seven, or after more steps.56,57
4.3 A comment on the replay argument
With our toy model we have illustrated a simple memory structure of con-
siderations leading from perception to action via different paths. In Table 3
we have shown some of these paths in detail, including values for the paths’
55Consider, for example, a network in which the probabilities in all branchings are
adjusted in such a way that the direct transitions to a1 (i.e. those from clips c0 and c1)
occur with probability p and the direct transition to a2 (i.e. the one from clip c2) with
probability 1− p (with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1). The effective probability for jumping is then given by
the expression pjump =
p(2−p)
1−p(1−p)2 . An effective 50:50 distribution among the two options
is obtained for the configuration with p ' 0.245, which is the real-valued solution of the
cubic equation p3 − 4p2 + 5p− 1 = 0.
56In our simple model, the action that can result after a given number of deliberation
steps is uniquely determined. This feature does not hold in general; it is due to the simple
structure of the network. In a network with an added transition from s to c2, for example,
both walking away and jumping are possible after two steps. To repeat, the example is
only meant to illustrate the basic dynamics of the PS model, not to provide a realistic
picture of an actual cat’s deliberation process in its full complexity.
57The average time of deliberation in our simple model, that is the average time after
which the cat acts (either jumping or walking away) is
〈T 〉delib =
∞∑
l=2
l∆t · pr(l) = 2∆t · 0.5 + 3∆t · 0.25 + 4∆t · 0.125 + . . . = 3∆t.
For those possibilities in which the cat eventually jumps, the average time of deliberation
is approximately 〈T 〉jump ' 2.76∆t. For those possibilities in which the cat eventually
walks away, the average time of deliberation is approximately 〈T 〉walk away ' 4.43∆t. This
difference illustrates that walking away or jumping, in this model, is not a point-like event
or decision, but an extended process with temporal fine structure.
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probabilities. These paths provide an internal description of the stochastic
development of the agent’s considerations. We have also given an external
description of which actions the stochastic development leads to (the mere
input-output coupling), both for the individual paths differentiated internally
(see the right hand column in Table 3) and in aggregate fashion (see the val-
ues for pjump and for pwalk away given above). Before this detailed background
is it useful to discuss an analogoue of an argument that in the free will debate
is often taken to speak against the compatibility of free will and indetermin-
ism: the so-called luck objection, and specifically, its perhaps strongest form,
Van Inwagen’s replay argument (Van Inwagen, 2000). As we have stressed
many times, we are here not concerned with the free will debate, but the re-
play argument has a structure that can easily be transferred to our discussion
of free agency.
The basic worry behind any form of the luck objection is that if some-
thing happens indeterministically, it is due to chance, and thus not due to an
agent. In this general form, the objection is easily dismissed—it construes
chance as an agent herself and then invokes a rivalry between being due to
chance and being due to the agent in question. However, calling something
“due to chance” is not yet an analysis, but a metaphorical redescription. A
lot more has to be said in order to show that the mere occurrence of an in-
deterministic event in the history of a happening disqualifies that happening
from being the action of an agent. A stronger form of the luck objection
points out that indeterministic happenings have no explanation. A fortiori,
they cannot be explained by the involvement of the agent, and thus, they
cannot be attributed to the agent, because attribution implies explanation.
This variant of the objection is more serious, but it can also be dismissed
once the notion of explanation in question has been clarified. It is true that
if at time t0, it is both really possible that at some later time t an event E
happens, and really possible that E fails to happen at t, then given that E
happens, there can be no full contrastive explanation for why E happened
rather than failed to happen. After all, both outcomes were possible as of
t0, so it is analytic that no full (sufficient) contrastive explanation can be
available. On the other hand, it is simply not true that such an event cannot
be explained.58 Consider the cat in our little story. If the cat walks away
58If you think one always needs to have a contrastive explanation for one’s choices,
consider the following joke: A mother buys her son two ties for his birthday. Next time
she sees him he’s wearing one of them, so she says to him “What, didn’t you like the other
one?”
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at time t0 + 4∆t, then the actual path of considerations from percept s to
action a2 explains why the cat did that: she did so on the basis of the ac-
tive consideration c2 about the remembered negative effects of jumping. If
one claims that such an explanation is not enough, one thereby just stipu-
lates that indeterminism precludes explanation and thus, attribution. This
is, however, just an inadequate stipulation that does not match our practices
of explanation and attribution.59
Van Inwagen’s replay argument is more specific than the two variants of
the luck objection just mentioned, and therefore more serious. He considers
a real action at some time (think of the cat walking away at time t0 +
4∆t) and the indeterministic real possibilities at some previous time (think
of the cat registering percept s at time t0). Van Inwagen prompts us to
imagine the situation to be replayed 100 times from time t0 on, and then to
record the frequencies of the occurrence of the various possible actions. These
frequencies can be interpreted as probabilities, and this shows, in his view,
that the original action cannot really be attributed to the agent because it
was just one run of a chance process, like a coin toss.
With the projective simulation model, we can meet the replay challenge
head-on.60 We just said that the PS agent can be described internally and
externally. The internal description in terms of the detailed dynamics of the
individually possible paths shows which transitions between memory clips can
lead from percept to action, thereby providing an action explanation based
on the agent’s historically grounded clip network. A concrete path also pro-
vides the handle for learning through feedback, e.g., by strengthening those
connections that were activated before an action that was rewarded. Thus,
59See, e.g., Anscombe (1971) for a discussion of the idea of explanation as “saying
enough”, and Feynman (1965, 147) for the famous example of causal explanation under
indeterminism referred to by Anscombe.
60We repeat that the replay argument is originally given in the context of a discussion
of free will. In fact, Van Inwagen’s actual example is of a woman who has to make a
morally important choice about either lying or telling the truth. The woman, Alice, in
fact tells the truth, but according to Van Inwagen, a consideration of possible replays
shows that we cannot praise Alice for her actual truth-telling, given that it is the result
of a random process. In this paper we do not discuss free will and moral attribution,
just agency attribution. We do not take a stance on whether there might be additional
factors in moral scenarios that might make moral attribution under indeterminism more
problematic than agency attribution under indeterminism. Certainly moral attribution is
a more complex phenomenon than agency attribution, which it presupposes. We believe,
however, that our discussion should also be helpful for the free will debate.
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such a path also influences the agent’s behavioral dispositions. The action is
thereby fully embedded in the agent’s ongoing developmental history. The
internal description provides a point of view from which the stochastic PS
dynamics makes sense for the agent.
The replay argument, on the other hand, is phrased in terms of an ex-
ternal description that only considers the final step of the dynamics, which
results in the action. This description lacks the detail to make an individ-
ual run understandable and thereby attributable. The external description
shields the resulting action from the actual dynamics and thereby provides a
description that indeed only offers an interpretation of what is going on as a
chance process. But for a PS agent, such a description lacks the crucial detail
of the internal dynamics. And apart from this structural point, there is also
an important quantitave point to be made about the timing of actions. In our
description of the internal dynamics in §4.2 we have seen that the length of
a deliberation process in the agent’s memory is not fixed beforehand, so that
an action can result at different times. The replay argument falsely suggests
that the different possible actions—the cat’s jumping or walking away, in
our toy example—are alternatives for the same time given the same relevant
past. The internal description shows that this is doubly wrong. First, there
is a difference in the relevant past in our toy model: the different actions
are linked to different considerations, and this difference explains how the
different actions all make sense.61 Second, the different actions need not be
alternatives for the exact same time. In fact, in the network of Figure 2,
if clip c1 is activated, action a1 can result immediately, but the immediate
alternative to action a1 is not action a2 (which would not make sense as flow-
ing from the consideration c1), but the associative activation of a different
consideration, c2, which can then lead to action a2 in a sensible way. Thus,
the immediate alternative to a certain action is normally not a different ac-
tion, but rather reconsidering, or continuing to deliberate.62 In fact, already
in our toy model, one of the alternatives to action a1 at time t is the same
action, a1, but at a later time, e.g., at t + 3∆t. This makes good sense phe-
nomenologically: Often it takes a while to get oneself to do something, and
while one is deciding, different considerations become salient, mostly with
61This aspect is often neglected. For example, Mele (2006, 58) assumes an agent who
“freely decided at t to A” and an alternative “with the same past until t”. Our discussion
points out that the same past may lie little while back.
62This point is also suggested, e.g., by Broad (1933, 240), Keil (2007, 115), and Steward
(2012, 155ff.).
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an associated next action. What one does is based on the consideration that
was active immediately before one acts, and it is not determined beforehand
how long one will deliberate. So even in our toy model with just two physical
actions a1 and a2, the internal dynamics forces one to acknowledge a further
possibility, viz., continuing the process of deliberation.63
A longer-term perspective further strengthens the case for the adequacy
of the internal perspective. The agent’s past is what shapes the transition
weights that form the background for the stochastic ECM dynamics at a
given time. Feedback after an action can result in changes in these weights,
thereby influencing future behavior. Such a longer-term perspective is typi-
cally missing in discussions of the luck objection. The longer-term perspective
is present in Kane’s model of self-forming actions, which, while targeting free
will, bears some relevant similarity to our account (see note 54). But it is
completely absent from Van Inwagen’s argument.
Note that even if the agent’s memory structure is such that the actions
a1 and a2 in the end both occur with a probability of 12 ,
64 it is not adequate
to think of the agent as tossing a fair coin to decide what to do. The indeter-
ministic decision process does not just provide an outcome satisfying certain
statistics, but in each and every run provides a path of considerations that
is shaped by the agent’s past experience. A coin toss would not do that; it
would destroy the sensibility of the agent’s action. And it would also not
provide a foothold for the longer-term dynamics of learning that free agents
can undergo. If in the case of a meaningful decision, the link between action
and considerations is given up, this threatens the agent’s integrity. The mere
fact that a deliberation process is indeterministic, on the other hand, does
not.
63Note that the indeterministic process of either continuing to deliberate or to act im-
mediately that we refer to here when describing the internal dynamics of a PS agent is not
itself an action, but just a part of the random process that realizes an action in the PS
model. Phenomenologically, we know that sometimes we consciously decide to continue
deliberating. This phenomenon is different, because it is itself an action. For example, one
may feel drawn to send off an angry text message, but actively force oneself to reconsider,
having learned from bad past experiences. Such active reconsidering occurs as a separate
action, and therefore on a higher level than the underlying PS dynamics.
64See note 55 for the respective transition probabilities in our toy model of Figure 2.
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5 Conclusion: A model-based argument for the
compatibility of free agency and indetermin-
ism
In this paper, we have proposed a novel approach to the question whether
there can be free agency under indeterminism. That question is of crucial im-
portance for our practical self-conception and for the freedom debate: There
are good reasons to assume that our world is indeterministic, and we consider
ourselves to be free agents in that world, so we should understand in which
way our freedom could be compatible with indeterminism. That question is
surprisingly little discussed.
The novelty of our approach lies in the aim we set ourselves and in the
chosen means. Our aim was to argue only for a positive compatibility claim:
for the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism. In the free will
debate, the only compatibility question that is regularly discussed as an iso-
lated question is about the compatibility of freedom and determinism. The
compatibility of free agency and indeterminism, however, is just one item
on the to-do list of would-be agency libertarians, i.e., of those who hold a
complex package deal of the incompatibility of free agency and determin-
ism, the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism, the existence of
free agency, and the truth of indeterminism. As we pointed out, this set-
ting up of the debate gives a biased picture of the available positions. Our
aim is much more modest than that of establishing agency libertarianism.
We need not be concerned with the compatibility or incompatibility of free
agency and determinism, nor with the actual truth of indeterminism. All we
were after in this paper was to prove the compatibility of free agency and
indeterminism, i.e., the possibility of a world that features both free agency
and indeterminism.
With respect to means, we opted for the direct route to establishing our
compatibility claim via an explicit, mathematically well defined and phys-
ically motivated class of models. We described the agency model of pro-
jective simulation and argued that it exhibits the sought-for combination
of free agency and indeterminism. Thus our main argument is a construc-
tive one, exhibiting examples of what we claim to be possible. In §4.3 we
also discussed a possible counterargument against our compatibility claim,
Van Inwagen’s replay argument. We showed that that argument cuts no ice
with us, since the internal stochastic dynamics of the PS model provides an
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adequate representation of decision finding under indeterminism.
Throughout our discussion we have tried to remain neutral with respect
to controversial issues of metaphysics and psychology. We have not invoked
any special theory of agent-causal powers, nor any metaphysically extrav-
agant assumptions. The core of our model is that a random process of
deliberation leading to action can in principle ground the sensible and at-
tributable free agency of a learning agent. We do not claim that our account
provides a psychologically or neurologically adequate picture of human free
agency, though we are interested in attempts to link the theory to the con-
crete material basis of our own agency. Even if it turns out that the material
basis of our own agency does not match our model, we claim that projective
simulation provides a framework for the conceptual discussion, and perhaps
also for the technological implementation, of indeterministic deliberation in
embodied free agents.
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